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ABSTRACT. Wild animals can represent both value and nuisance. We consider the moose (Al-
ces alces), which due to seasonal migration causes browsing damage in some areas while creat-
ing hunting value in other areas. We first explore a situation when harvesting, following today’s 
practice in Norway, only takes place in the fall. Next, the season is extended to include winter 
harvesting. It is shown how this redistributes harvesting benefits between areas and landowners, 
and under which conditions total net benefit increases. The model is illustrated by a real life 
example from the Swe-Nor moose region some 250 kilometers north of Oslo, Norway. (JEL Q26) 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Background 
In many cases, wild animals create benefits for humans. Quite frequently, however, we 
also find that wild species are a nuisance. Rodents damaging agricultural production may be a 
typical example (see, e.g., Stenseth et al. 2003). In other instances, wild animals are both a nui-
sance and valuable. Some marine species may be of this type where whales prey upon, or com-
pete with, commercially valuable species like cod (Flaaten and Stollery 1996). An elephant 
population causing grazing damage, but at the same time also creating consumption and non-
consumption values, is another example (see, e.g., Bulte and van Kooten 1999). Because of the 
fugitive nature of the species, however, we can also see that species may cause damage in some 
areas while being valuable in other areas. Consequently, different agents, or groups of people, 
may consider the same wild animals both valuable and a pest. An elephant population (a park 
manager and the local people, see, e.g., Schulz and Skonhoft 1996) and a whale population 
(whale hunters and cod fishers, again, see Flaaten and Stollery 1996) may again serve as exam-
ples. In this paper we consider the moose (Alces alces), which causes browsing damage in some 
areas while creating hunting values in other areas. The analysis is carried out in a Scandinavian 
institutional, economic and ecological setting. 
The moose is the world’s largest member of the deer family and is found in the northern 
forests of North America, Europe and Russia. It is by far the most important game species in the 
Scandinavian countries, and in Norway and Sweden about 40,000 and 100,000 animals, respec-
tively, are shot every year (Saether et al. 1992). This hunting, taking place in September/October, 
is also an important social and cultural event in a large number of rural communities. However, 
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the moose population also causes various costs. There is a high incidence of moose-vehicle colli-
sions, and there is browsing damage during the winter when young pine trees are an important 
food source. This damage may be considerable (Storaas et al. 2001). Because of large spatial 
variations in densities during the winter season, the browsing damage is, however, quite un-
evenly distributed between different areas. Migration and concentration are two important factors 
explaining these differences, as some sub-populations tend to leave their summer ranges and 
graze in specific winter ranges due to snow and forage conditions (Ball et al. 2000). Hence, as 
hunting takes place in the fall before the yearly migration, there is often an asymmetry between 
areas where the benefit of harvesting is obtained and areas with heavy browsing damage; that is, 
for some landowners the moose creates value while for other landowners it is merely a pest (see, 
e.g., Saether et al. 1992 for more details). 
 
The Scope of the Analysis  
The scope of this paper is to analyze this problem within a model framework that links 
two strands of studies within the bio-economic literature—spatial dispersal studies, and pest and 
nuisance studies. Recently there has been quite a strong emphasis on bio-economic models with 
spatial distribution as a key element, in most instances formulated within the context of marine 
reserves (see, e.g., Conrad 1999; Sanchirico and Wilen 2001; Anderson 2002). These models 
have, among others, analyzed under what ecological and economic conditions, and to what ex-
tent, marine reserve creation may increase aggregate biomass and change the profitability of a 
fishery. A somewhat different type of study is Skonhoft et al. (2002), who analyzed the optimal 
management of a chamois population moving between a protected area and a surrounding hunt-
ing area. Yet another example is Huffaker et al. (1992) who analyze a beaver population in a 
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two-patch system managed by two different landowners, where the beaver population represents 
no value but is a nuisance (damage on timber stands) and costly to hunt in one of the areas. Bath 
et al. (1996) presents another analysis of basically the same model. These last two papers also 
have some similarities with the more recent paper by Zivin et al. (2000), which studies the opti-
mal management of the Californian feral pig that represents both value and a pest. In Zivin et al. 
however, there is no explicitly formulated spatial model. 
The following analysis of moose as valuable and a pest utilizes a stylized bio-economic 
framework where we consider two areas of fixed size, two landowners and two sub-populations 
of moose. The fact that the moose is partly a migratory species is modeled by allowing a fraction 
of one of the sub-populations to migrate from one of the areas to the other during the winter sea-
son, and hence causing forestry damage here. The present analysis is most similar to that of Huf-
faker et al. (1992). However, the dispersal is not density dependent in our study (see below), and 
the moose is both valuable and a pest, not only a pest. Because of the dispersal and because the 
moose is valuable and a pest, there will be an economic interdependency between the sub-
populations, the two areas and the two landowners. We analyze the externalities following this 
interdependency within a unified management scheme where the wildlife manager (the planner) 
aims to find harvesting quotas that maximize profit, harvesting income minus forestry damage, 
of the two areas taken together in biological equilibrium. This management goal is more or less 
in accordance with the actual management policy in Norway and in Scandinavia, but migration is 
not taken directly into account.1 The wildlife manager therefore sets quotas for the areas based 
on an overall economic and ecological assessment, and the cost and benefits streams of the land-
owners, i.e., the property rights over the wildlife (see, e.g., Bromley 1991), are accordingly con-
trolled by the wildlife manager. 
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Two different harvesting schemes, implying different cost and benefit streams between 
the areas and landowners, are considered. In Regime 1, analyzed in Section II, we first explore a 
situation when harvesting, following today’s practice, only takes place in the fall. In Regime 2, 
analyzed in Section III, the wildlife manager changes this practice and extends the season to in-
clude winter harvesting as well. The moose is then potentially harvested both in the fall and in 
the winter, and we have sequential harvesting. Still under the assumption that the profit of the 
two areas is maximized within a unified management scheme, we study how this new practice 
may change harvesting and profitability. Section IV illustrates the two regimes numerically by a 
real life example from the so-called Swe-Nor moose region some 250 kilometers north of Oslo, 
Norway. 
 
II.  THE POPULATION EQUATIONS, THE COST AND BENEFIT FUNCTIONS AND 
REGIME 1 MANAGEMENT 
 
General Functional Forms 
As noted, we consider two areas of fixed size, areas 1 and 2, with two different landown-
ers, owners 1 and 2, and two sub-populations of moose, sub-populations 1 and 2. Saether et al. 
(1992) make a distinction between three migration patterns of Alces alces. We focus on the most 
common one, namely sub-populations with a distinct and more or less fixed yearly migration 
pattern between a summer range and a winter range. This pattern is modeled by letting a fixed 
fraction of one of the sub-populations migrate in a density-independent manner during the win-
ter.2 Because of the snow and forage conditions, it is assumed that the dispersal runs from area 1 
to area 2.3 These two areas are considered a closed system, and after winter, all the migratory 
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moose return to their summer range. The regular hunting season is September/October, before 
the yearly migration. We thus have harvesting benefits that are directly related to the summer 
range of the two sub-populations, while the migrating fraction of sub-population 1 causes brows-
ing damage in area 2 during the winter season but not vice versa since sub-population 2 is sta-
tionary throughout the year. Because hunting and browsing damage take place sequentially, but 
more importantly because sequential harvesting is also considered (Section III), the population 
model is formulated in a time-discrete manner and harvesting activity is represented by fractions, 
not by absolute number of animals. 
Neglecting any stochastic variations in environment and biology, the equations 
 
1, 1 1, 1, 1,(1 ) ( )t t t tX h X F X+ ⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦   [1] 
 
and 
 
2, 1 2, 2, 2,(1 ) ( )t t t tX h X G X+ ⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦   [2] 
 
 
give the population dynamics where ,i tX ( i =  1, 2) is the size of sub-population i measured as 
biomass (or number of ‘normalized’ animals) year t , ,0 1i th≤ <  is the fraction harvested the same 
year, and 1,( )tF X  and 2,( )tG X are the density-dependent natural growth functions assumed to be 
of the logistic type (see below). In more detail, 1,tX is the size of the population after winter in 
area 1, which determines natural growth as calving happens in May/June (cf. Figure 1). Natural 
growth takes place before the hunting season in September/October (Saether et al. 1992), 
1, 1,( )t tX F X+ is accordingly the biomass before hunting, which is reduced 
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to 1, 1, 1,(1 )[ ( )]t t th X F X− + after hunting. The fraction of the population migrating from area 1 to 
area 2 after the hunting season, depending on snow and food conditions, in addition to the topog-
raphy and size of the areas, is fixed as 0 1≤ α ≤ . The migratory population out of area 1 is there-
fore 1, 1, 1,(1 ) [ ( )]t t th X F X− α +  so that the remaining stock browsing here during the winter be-
comes 1, 1, 1, 1,(1 )(1 )[ ( )]t t t tZ h X F X= − −α +  (again, see Figure 1). When neglecting natural mortal-
ity, which is very low (Saether et al.1992), and assuming that all animals return after the winter 
season, 1, 1, 1,(1 )[ ( )]t t th X F X− +  is therefore the size of the sub-population 1 the next year. For 
sub-population 2 we have the same annual cycle except that there is no dispersal. 
2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1,(1 )[ ( )] (1 ) [ ( )]t t t t t t tZ h X G X h X F X= − + + − α +  is, hence, the winter stock browsing in 
area 2 during the winter season (Figure 1). Notice that there is no biological interdependency 
between the two sub-populations because there is no density-dependent mortality during the win-
ter and no winter harvesting (see below). 
 
Figure 1 about here 
           All the time we assume stable populations. In ecological equilibrium we 
have , 1 ,i t i t iX X X+ = =  and ,i t ih h=  ( i =1,2), and [1] and [2] write [ ]1 1 1 1(1 ) ( )X h X F X= − + and 
[ ]2 2 2 2(1 ) ( )X h X G X= − + , respectively. When replacing the harvesting fractions, the winter 
populations may then be written as 1 1 1 1 1(1 )(1 )[( ( )] (1 )Z h X F X X= − −α + = −α  and 
2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1(1 )[ ( )] (1 ) [ ( )]Z h X G X h X F X X X= − + + − α + = +α . As forest damage to pine trees oc-
curs during winter, these winter stocks determine the browsing damage. The damage functions 
are given by ( )i i iD D Z=  with (0) 0iD = , / 0i i iD Z D ′∂ ∂ = >  and ´´ 0iD ≥ ( 1,2i = ) (Storaas et al. 
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2001). The damage may vary between areas due to different quality of the timber stands, or sim-
ply different productivity of the forests.4 The equilibrium number of animals harvested 
is ( )1 1 1 1 1[ ( )]H h X F X F X= + =  and ( )2 2 2 2 2[ ( )]H h X G X G X= + = , respectively. The unit hunt-
ing license price, identical in the two areas, is assumed to be independent of the amount har-
vested and the stock sizes.5 Following the practice in Scandinavia, one license allows the buyer 
to kill one animal, which is paid only if the animal is killed. When further assuming that the cost   
of the landowners of organizing the hunting is constant per animal shot and hence stock inde-
pendent, the ´net´ license price is fixed as p. The yearly net-benefit in the two areas in biological 
equilibrium read therefore 1 1 1 1( ) ((1 ) )pF X D Xπ = − −α  and 2 2 2 2 1( ) ( )pG X D X Xπ = − +α . 
           Because of the dispersal, but also because the moose is a pest and not only a value, there 
is an economic interdependency between the two sub-populations and the two areas. As men-
tioned, we analyze the harvest and browsing externalities following this interdependency within 
a unified management scheme, and the wildlife manager aims to find hunting quotas for the areas 
that maximize the total profit. Hence, ( )1 2π = π + π  is to be maximized. The first order condi-
tions of this problem read:6 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )* * * *1 1 1 2 2 11 1 1F X D X D X Xp ⎡ ⎤′′ ′= −α −α +α +α⎣ ⎦  [3] 
 
 
and 
 
( ) ( )* * *2 2 2 11G X D X Xp′ ′= + α   [4] 
 
       10    
 
and where superscript ‘*’ denotes the optimal stock sizes. The biomass harvested, or hunting 
quotas, may next be calculated as ( )* *1 1H F X=  and ( )* *2 2H G X= while the harvesting fractions 
follow as * * * *1 1 1 1( ) /[ ( )]h F X X F X= +  and * * * *2 2 2 2( ) /[ ( )]h G X X G X= + . 
Condition [3] indicates that harvesting should take place up to the point where the mar-
ginal natural growth is equal to the marginal grazing damage, evaluated at the hunting license 
price, and where the damage in both areas is taken into account due to the dispersal. Multiplying 
by p it is also seen that this condition says that the stock should be kept at the point where the 
marginal harvesting value is exactly balanced by the marginal damage. Because the right hand 
side of condition [3] is positive, the population size *1X  will always be below that of 
*
1( ) 0F X′ = , 
or *1 1
msyX X< . The interpretation of condition [4] is exactly the same, except that there is no 
spillover of browsing damage. *2 2
msyX X<  will also hold. 
By taking the total differential of the two first order conditions the comparative static re-
sults can be found. A positive shift in the harvesting price gives a higher sub-population 1, and 
hence *1X  moves closer to 1
msyX  while the sub-population 2 effect is ambiguous. The direct ef-
fect is that browsing damage, measured in terms of the harvesting price, decreases, and hence 
both sub-populations increase. But when sub-population 1 increases accompanied by more dis-
persal, the damage in area 2 shifts up, and thus the total effect here is unclear (but see next sub-
section). On the other hand, an upward shift in the marginal damage cost always means lower 
stock size. The dispersal coefficient has also generally ambiguous stock effects. A shift in α  
works through the damage functions, and the direct effect on sub-population 1 is unclear, as the 
marginal damage in both areas has to be taken into account. Because of the ambiguous sub-
population 1 effect, the sub-population 2 effect is ambiguous as well. The number of moose har-
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vested *iH will change in the same direction as the stock because 
* msy
i iX X< , while it can easily 
be demonstrated that harvesting rates *ih  will change in the opposite direction. 
These last comparative static results imply that today’s management practice of neglect-
ing dispersal (cf. the Introduction) has ambiguous stock as well as harvesting effects. On the 
other hand, the total profit will clearly be lower when harvesting rates and stock sizes are imple-
mented as if there were no dispersal. The present management policy may also redistribute profit 
between areas, and thus influence the economic outcome of the landowners compared to a situa-
tion where dispersal is ignored. To see how this works, we specify the functional forms. Later, in 
Section 4, additional insight is demonstrated by running numerical examples. 
 
Specific Functional Forms 
We specify logistic natural growth functions, 1 1 1 1( ) (1 / )F X rX X K= −  and 
2 2 2 2( ) (1 / )G X rX X K= − , with 0r > as the maximum specific growth rate, assumed to be identi-
cal for both sub-populations, and 0iK > as carrying capacity. We use linear damage functions so 
that 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) (1 )D Z a Z a X= = −α , with 1 0a > , is for area 1 while 2 2 2 2 2 2 1( ) ( )D Z a Z a X X= = +α , 
with 2 0a > , is for area 2 (but see Appendix 2 for convex cost functions). Inserted into the first 
order conditions [3] and [4], we obtain ( ) ( )*1 1 21 /F X a a p′ = −α + α⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  and ( )*2 2 /G X a p′ = . 
When solving for stock size, the results are 
 
* 1 1 2
1
(1 )
2
K a aX r
r p
⎡ ⎤−α + α= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦   [5] 
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and 
 
* 2 2
2 2
K aX r
r p
⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ,  [6] 
       
 
respectively. 
 
These first order conditions represent two independent equations, and hence, when the 
damage functions are linear, each sub-population may be managed separately in the present 
meaning of efficiency. On the other hand, when deciding stock size in area 1, the dispersal coef-
ficient plays a role because it determines the marginal damage by stock 1 when the marginal 
damage in each area differs. Accordingly, if the marginal damages are equal, the dispersal rate 
vanishes from equation [5]. Notice also that the dispersal parameter does not affect the stock 
decision in area 2. This result hinges again on the constant marginal damage assumption (again 
see Appendix 2). When combining [5] and [6] it is seen that optimal stock density in area 1 will 
be above that of area 2 if the marginal grazing damage is lower there; that is, * *1 1 2 2/ /X K X K>  if 
2 1a a>  for all 0 1≤ α < . This is quite an intuitively appealing result as the harvesting price is the 
same in the two areas. With the same cost assumption, we also find * *1 1 2 2/ /H K H K> . 
Under these specific functional forms, a higher hunting license price means more animals 
in both areas. More productive ecological conditions, i.e., higher carrying capacities and a higher 
maximum species growth rate, work in the same direction. As noted, α  has no sub-population 2 
effect, but the sub-population 1 effect is still ambiguous as we have *1 / 0X∂ ∂α <  if 2 1a a>  since 
more migration then increases the overall damage. The profitability effects are generally unclear. 
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Differentiation of * * *1 1 1 1( ) (1 )pF X a Xπ = − −α , and using the first order condition yields 
* * *
1 1 1 1 1/ ( ' (1 ))( / )pF a X a X∂π ∂α = − −α ∂ ∂α + * *2 1 1 1( / )a X a X= α ∂ ∂α + . The area 2 profit 
( )* * * *2 2 2 2 1( )pG X a X Xπ = − +α  is also affected, and the crucial point is what happens to *1X  and, 
hence, the number of migratory species, since * * *2 2 1 1/ ( ( / ))a X X∂π ∂α = − +α ∂ ∂α . Adding these, 
the effect on total profit is simply * *1 2 1/ ( )a a X∂π ∂α = − . In line with intuition, more dispersal, 
therefore, means lower total profit suggested that 2 1a a> . Hence, under this cost assumption, 
total cost increases with more dispersal and dominates any possible upward shift in harvesting 
income. 
Given these functional forms, today’s practice of neglecting dispersal also has some clear 
profitability implications most conveniently demonstrated for area 2, as 
( )* * * *2 2 2 2 1( )pG X a X Xπ = − +α  is only influenced by *2 1a Xα  since *2X is not affected by α  (cf. 
equations [5] and [6]). The area 2 profit change may then simply be written as 0 *2 1 1[( ]a X Xα −  
where 01X  is the optimal chosen stock size if there had been no dispersal while
*
1X  is the optimal 
stock size subject to the actual dispersal rate. From equation [5] we observed that *1X decreases 
with α  suggesting that 1 2a a< . Under this browsing cost difference assumption, 01X domi-
nates *1X  for all 0 1< α ≤  and the above expression therefore represents a loss of profitability. 
Additional insight will be demonstrated when presenting the numerical examples in Section IV. 
 
III. REGIME 2 MANAGEMENT WITH SEQUENTIAL HARVESTING 
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We have modeled the harvesting benefit and damage cost specific to the area and not the 
landowner. However, if the hunting quotas, in number of animals (or biomass), are distributed to 
landowner 1 and 2, respectively, and landowner 1 bears the damage cost taking place in area 1 
while landowner 2 bears the cost in area 2, the area-specific profit coincides with landowner 
profit. As already indicated, such a property rights scheme is more or less in line with the present 
management practice in Norway, even if it may cause substantial asymmetries between the cost 
and benefit between landowners. Irrespective of such asymmetries, however, the general rule is 
that the quotas set by the wildlife manager are respected, and it is close to no cheating or illegal 
harvesting.7 The important reason for this is the strong social control of Scandinavian moose 
hunting which, as already mentioned, is a crucial social event taking place in a large number of 
rural communities (see, e.g., Saether et al. 1992). However, due to asymmetries, various com-
pensation schemes may be established. Following the logic of our model, landowner 1 can pay 
for some (or all) of the grazing damage caused by sub-population 1 on landowner 2’s property. 
Granting area 1 hunting licenses to landowner 2 may be another type of compensation scheme, 
and this is what actually takes place within the Swe-Nor moose region (cf. Section IV below). 
Instead of analyzing such compensation schemes, we will assume that the wildlife man-
ager changes the present practice of hunting only in the fall and extends the harvesting season to 
include winter harvesting as well. The moose is then potentially harvested both in the fall and in 
the winter, and we will explore, still under the assumption of unified management, whether this 
(institutional) change may induce more correspondence between landowners' costs and benefits 
while still assuming that area-specific profits coincide with landowner profits. Moreover, we 
want to study under what conditions total profitability may, in fact, increase. Winter harvesting is 
taking place in Sweden, but is not yet an option in Norway (Olaussen 2000). 
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When introducing winter harvesting we have so-called sequential harvesting.8 Because 
the dispersal runs from area 1 to area 2, only area 2 winter harvesting is considered. Moreover, 
quite intuitively, if sequential harvesting should be of any economic interest, it must take place 
before the moose cause any substantial damage in the winter grazing area, i.e., in Decem-
ber/January. Since the moose then typically stay within a very limited part of the winter habitat, 
an effective winter off take is possible. Two harvesting options in area 2 are present. One possi-
bility is that all the harvest takes place in the winter, meaning that only the migratory moose 
from area 1 are sequentially harvested. Another possibility is to hunt in area 2 in the fall as well 
so that both the remaining fraction of sub-population 2 and the migratory population 1 are ex-
posed to sequential hunting. Both these possibilities are considered. 
If ty  represents the fraction harvested in area 2 during the winter, both of the migratory 
and stationary animals as it is not possible to select between them, the population dynamics [1] 
and [2] (cf. also Figure 1) change to 
 
1, 1 1, 1, 1,(1 )[(1 ) (1 ) ][ ( )]t t t t tX h y X F X+ = − −α + − α +  [7] 
 
and 
 
2, 1 2, 2, 2,(1 )(1 )[ ( )]t t t t tX y h X G X+ = − − + .  [8] 
 . 
 
Equation [7] indicates that the sub-population 1 harvest in area 2 during the winter is 
1, 1, 1,(1 ) [ ( )]t t t ty h X F X− α +  so that the number of animals returning back to the summer range 
after the winter is 1, 1, 1,(1 )(1 ) [ ( )]t t t ty h X F X− − α + . Equation [8] implies that the winter harvest of 
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sub-population 2 is 2, 2, 2,(1 )[ ( )]t t t ty h X G X− + . The winter stock in area 1 is the same as in the 
case without winter harvesting, 1, 1, 1, 1,(1 )(1 )[ ( )]t t t tZ h X F X= − −α + , while winter stock causing 
browsing damage in area 2 now becomes 
2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1,(1 ){(1 )[ ( )] (1 ) [ ( )]}t t t t t t t tZ y h X G X h X F X= − − + + − α +  when winter harvesting takes 
place before the damage. In contrast to the previous model, the migration coefficient α  now in-
fluences the ecology, but only sub-population1, and this happens indirectly through harvesting. 
            In ecological equilibrium, equations [7] and [8] read 1 1 1 1(1 )(1 )[ ( )]X h y X F X= − − α +  
and 2 2 2 2(1 )(1 )[ ( )]X y h X G X= − − + , respectively. Because the harvesting rate 1h  will always be 
positive, while 2h  may be positive or zero (see below), the most convenient way to study the 
solution of this model seems to be to substitute 1h  away from the profit functions by using the 
sub-population 1 equilibrium condition and introduce the sub-population 2 equilibrium condition 
as a constraint. When still assuming linear damage functions, the area 1 equilibrium profit func-
tion may be written as ( )1 1 1 1 1
[(1 ) ( ) ] (1 )
1 (1 )
p y F X y X a X
y y
= − α − α −απ −− α − α  when 1h  is replaced (see Ap-
pendix 1 for details). The first term on the RHS gives harvesting profit while the second term 
yields browsing damage. When 0q >  is the winter harvesting license price, assumed to be fixed 
and independent of the stock size and also a ’net’ price of the landowners, area 2 profit may in 
the same manner be written as 2π =  
1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2[ ( )] {(1 )[ ( )] } (1 ){(1 )[ ( )] }(1 ) (1 )
X Xph X G X qy h X G X a y h X G X
y y
α α+ + − + + − − − + +− α − α
where the first RHS term gives the harvesting profit in the fall, the second term is the winter har-
vesting profit while the last term yields the damage cost. 
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           The hunting license price is presumably lower in the winter than in the fall because of, 
inter alia, a thinner market for hunting licenses9. Accordingly, p ≥ q is assumed to hold in the 
following. The economic objective is still to maximize total profit ( )1 2π = π + π . The Lagrangian 
of this maximization problem can be written as 
1 2 2 2 2 2( ) {(1 )(1 )[ ( )] }L y h X G X X= π + π + λ − − + −  when the sub-population 2 equilibrium condi-
tion is introduced as a constraint so that λ  may be interpreted as the sub-population 2 shadow 
price. Because both sub-populations create both positive and negative value and the license 
prices are stock-independent, harvest will take place in both areas, i.e., *1 0h >  and * *2( ) 0h y+ > . 
Generally there are three possibilities in area 2; a) * *2 0, 0h y> > , b) * *2 0, 0h y= >  and c) 
* *
2 0, 0h y> = . We study these cases in turn and we start with case a). 
 
Case a) 
Appendix 1 demonstrates that case a) with * *2 0, 0h y> >  occurs when 
 
* *
* 1 1 2
1 *
(1 ) (1 ) ( )
2 (1 )
K a a y p q yX r
r p y
⎡ ⎤−α + − α + − α= −⎢ ⎥− α⎣ ⎦
, [9] 
 
 
 
* *
* 2 2
2 *
( ) (1 )
2 (1 )
K p q y a yX r
r p y
⎡ ⎤− + −= −⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
  [10] 
  
 
and 
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( )2 1
* 2 *
2
* 2 *
1
(1 )
( )
(1 )1
(1 )
a a
p q
y X
y X
− −α− = − α+ − α
  [11] 
 
 
hold. These three equations jointly determine *1X ,
*
2X  and 
*y , while *1h  and 
*
2h  follow from the 
ecological equilibrium conditions. The harvesting quotas, in number of animals (or biomass), can 
then be found. Under the present assumption of p q≥ , equation [11] is fulfilled under two main 
conditions; either when p q=  is accompanied by 1 2a a=  or 1α = , or when p q>  holds to-
gether with 2 1a a>  and 0 1< α < . We discuss these two sub-cases, a.i) and a.ii), respectively,  in 
turn. 
           In sub-case a.i) with equal harvesting prices p q=  and equal marginal damage in the two 
areas a1=a2=a, we have one degree of freedom in the system as equation [11] vanishes and gives 
no information.10 At the same time, conditions [9] and [10] reduce to *1 1( / 2 )( / )X K r r a p= −  
and *2 2( / 2 )( / )X K r r a p= − , respectively. Consequently, as in the linear model without winter 
harvesting, equilibrium stock sizes are determined independently of each other. In equilibrium, 
the sub-population 2 equation [8] may be written as * * * * *2 2 2 2(1 )(1 ) / ( )y h X X G X⎡ ⎤− − = +⎣ ⎦ . 
Since *2X  is determined from the above reduced version of condition [10] alone, this means that 
all combinations of *2h and
*y being in accordance with the population equilibrium condition, rep-
resent efficient harvesting rates. The area 2 harvesting rates are therefore not uniquely deter-
mined due to the fact that there is one degree of freedom in the system. The economic reason for 
this result is that when there are no price or cost differences, overall profitability is not affected 
when the moose is harvested in area 2. For a given *y  in accordance with the sub-population 2 
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equilibrium condition and with *1X  fixed by the first order condition [9], the area 1 harvesting 
rate follows next from the sub-population 1 equilibrium condition as 
* * * * *
1 1 1 11 /(1 )[ ( )]h X y X F X= − − α + . A numerical illustration is given below. 
      Sub-case a.ii), when * 0y >  and *2 0h > , follows when p q>  holds together with 2 1a a>  and 
0 1< α < . In this case, equation [11] does not vanish, and the first order condition [9], [10] and 
[11] simultaneously determine *1X ,
*
2X and 
*y . This sub-case can be considered somewhat more 
general than a.i), as a strictly lower winter harvesting license price seems more realistic (cf. note 
9). Higher profit when the winter harvesting price is lower seems counterintuitive. The reason is, 
however, quite simple as winter harvesting means that it is possible to separate the harvest of the 
migratory and the stationary fraction of sub-population 1, and thus hunt the fraction of the migra-
tory sub-population causing most severe browsing damage more efficiently.11 As above, it can be 
shown that the dispersal coefficient has no effect on the sub-population 2 stock. On the other 
hand, just as in the model without winter harvesting, we find *1 / 0X∂ ∂α < , as more migration 
means increased grazing damage, and hence it is economically beneficial to reduce the number 
of migratory animals. 
 
Case b) and c) 
             We then have case b) with *2 0h =  and * 0y > so it is profitable to only harvest sequen-
tially the migratory species from area 1. In Appendix 1, it is shown that the economic and eco-
logical conditions for this result is that 
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( )2 1
* 2 *
2
* 2 *
1
(1 )
( )
(1 )1
(1 )
a a
p q
y X
y X
− −α− < − α+ − α
  [12] 
 
 
should hold. Hence, if p q=  is accompanied by 2 1a a> , and 0 1< α < , area 2 harvesting in the 
fall is not profitable. The reason is obvious as there is no price effect due to the lower harvesting 
value counteracting the gain of selective harvesting. On the other hand, if p q> , there must be a 
certain gap between the marginal damage costs if it is to be economically beneficial, with the 
entire area 2 harvest taking place during the winter (see also the numerical illustrations given 
below). 
             This leads us to the final case c) with *2 0h >  and * 0y = , and no sequential harvesting at 
all. Hence, we are back in the previous Regime 1 management situation. The stock sizes are then 
found by [9] and [10], coinciding with equations [5] and [6], respectively. The economic and 
ecological conditions leading to this outcome may be stated as 
 
( )2 1
*
2
*
1
(1 )
( )
1
a a
p q
X
X
− −α− >
+ α
  [13] 
 
 
(again, see Appendix 1). Consequently, if p q> holds, together with 2 1a a= , and 0 1< α < , no 
sequential harvesting is profitable as these economic conditions obviously produce no gain from 
selective harvesting. Moreover, even if there is a selection gain, and we have 2 1a a> , the same 
may happen if the loss due to lower harvesting price in the winter dominates the potential gain 
from selection. 
       21    
 
            When *1X and 
*
2X are replaced by equations [9] and [10] with
* 0y = , or equivalently by 
[5] and [6], it is possible to say something more definite as [13] then yields 
 
( )
2 1
2
2
1 2
1
( )(1 )( )
1
1
a ap q v
aK r
p
a a
K r
p
− −α− > =⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦+ −α +⎡ ⎤α −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
.  [13`] 
 
Hence, v yields the smallest price difference that ensures * 0y = . When 2 1a a>  and 0v > , situa-
tion c) with *2 0h > and * 0y =  therefore occurs when ( )q p v< − . This case is also illustrated 
numerically below. 
 
IV. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
Our theoretical models will now be illustrated by data from the so-called Swe-Nor moose 
region on the border between Sweden and Norway, some 250 kilometers north of Oslo. The Swe 
part of the region, located in Torsby municipality (Sweden), covers 43,600 ha, while the Nor part 
of the region, located in Trysil municipality (Norway), covers 78,300 ha, altogether 121,900 ha. 
This region fits well with the present assumption of winter migration. Due to snow and forage 
conditions, the winter migration runs from Nor to Swe. It is estimated that about 30 percent of 
the moose browsing in the Swe area in the winter are migratory moose from the Nor area, and 
the forestry damage here is considerable. A unified management plan for the whole area is 
worked out, and harvesting quotas are allocated to the Nor part and the Swe part proportionally 
to the number of animals in the areas before migration takes place. The presence of dispersal and 
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damage in the Swe area is reflected by the fact that Swe landowners are given hunting licenses in 
the Nor area; that is, a kind of side-payment is present (for more details, see Olaussen 2000). The 
harvest in both areas takes place before the winter migration. 
As above, we specify logistic natural growth functions and use linear damage functions. 
All parameter values in the simulations are based on Olaussen (2000). The maximum species 
growth rate is given as 0.47r =  while 1 4,550K =  and 2 2,540K =  (number of moose) are the 
carrying capacities, assumed to be proportional to the size of the areas, so that area 1 is referring 
to Nor while area 2 is Swe. The price of the fall hunting license is 6,500p =  (NOK per moose, 
1999 prices) while the marginal damage cost is higher in Swe than in Nor as Swe is mainly lo-
cated at a lower altitude with a more productive forestry. In the baseline calculations, the mar-
ginal damage costs are given as 1 1,500a =  and 2 2,500a =  (NOK per moose, 1999 prices). The 
baseline migration parameter is assumed to be 0.2α = . However, because of the importance of 
dispersal, we also study the effects of other values. Table 1 reports the results for various values 
ofα  when we have management Regime 1 and hence no winter harvesting. 
 
Table 1 about here 
Sub-population 1 falls with increased migration because 2 1a a>  while sub-population 2 is 
unaffected, cf. equations [5] and [6] above. Under the given cost assumption, it is then profitable 
to reduce the total stock compared to a scenario without dispersal. Furthermore, area 1 profit 
initially increases when α  shifts up and then decreases,12 while area 2 profit exhibits the oppo-
site pattern. Total profit falls. It is also seen that *2π  becomes negative when α  exceeds a certain 
(small) value. However, it should be noted that this is a calculated loss, as the forest damage in 
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most instances represents future profit loss (cf. Section II). In Appendix 2 we demonstrate what 
happens when the damage cost functions are strictly convex. 
Today’s practice of ignoring migration may also be illustrated. As an example, assume 
that 20 percent of sub-population 1 stays in area 2 during winter (baseline assumption), 0.2α = , 
but this is not taken into account and stock sizes are managed as if no migration is present, 
0α = . This has no consequences for the efficient allocation of sub-population 2, while sub-
population 1 becomes too high; 01 1,158X =  animals instead of *1 1,009X =  (Table 1), cf. also 
Section 2's analytical demonstration. Using the actual migration rate, 0.2α = , this stock size 
gives an annual profit of 1,248 (1,000 NOK) in area 1 and –515 in area 2.13 The area 1 profit is 
thus 60 (1,248 – 1,188) higher than if dispersal had been taken into account, while area 2 profit is 
75 (-515 – (-440)) lower. Hence, the profit loss in area 2 dominates the gain in area 1, resulting 
in an overall annual loss of 15. The area 1 net gain is due to an addition of 238 in harvesting 
benefit, dominating an additional loss of 178 in grazing damage. The area 2 loss reflects more 
grazing damage caused by the migratory species, as the size of sub-population 2 is unchanged. 
As demonstrated, the consequence of neglecting migration translates into a substantial 
profit transfer between the areas while the overall loss is quite modest (just 2 percent). With 
more dispersal the profit transfer and the total loss increase, and for 0.4α =  and 0.6 the overall 
loss is about 10 and 33 percent, respectively. Generally, the loss increases for higher grazing 
damage and more substantial cost differences (see also Section 2 above). It is also important to 
realize that no ecological mechanism reveals this type of allocation error as the dispersal does 
not influence the ecology; that is, all corresponding harvesting rates and stock levels in Table 1 
fit the sub-population 1 ecological equilibrium condition 1 1 1 1(1 )[ ( )]X h X F X= − + . Moreover, as 
the grazing damage basically represents future calculated profit losses, there is no clear economic 
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signal indicating allocation errors. These two features may explain today’s practice of ignoring 
migration. 
We now illustrate the Regime 2 winter harvesting management. We start with the situa-
tion when both sub-populations are sequentially harvested given the same harvesting prices win-
ter and fall, together with the same marginal damage cost in both areas. This was referred to as 
case a.i) in the above Section III, and it was demonstrated that all combinations of area 2 winter 
and fall harvesting in accordance with the population equilibrium represented efficient harvest-
ing rates. Table 2 gives an illustration for various values of *y . 
 
Table 2 about here 
             While *1X and
*
2X are independent of the harvesting composition in area 2, both 
*
2h  
and *1h  decrease when y
* increases. Total profit, *π , is also unaffected by the area 2 harvesting 
composition as all harvest rates in accordance with the biological equilibrium for sub-population 
2 represent profit maximizing allocations. Because winter harvesting affects the harvest rate in 
area 1, the distribution of the fixed total profit between *1π  and *2π  changes for various values 
of *y , and in line with intuition, more winter harvesting increases area 2 profit at the expense of 
area 1 profit. 
              When landowner profit coincides with area-specific profit, profit may be redistributed 
between landowners by implementing winter harvesting without affecting total profitability. Un-
der the given price and cost conditions, this is obviously a very effective instrument for redistri-
bution, and it is possible to attain a close correspondence between the costs and benefits facing 
landowners. In addition, we find that the migration coefficient influences neither the equilibrium 
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populations, harvesting rates, *2h  and 
*y , nor total profit. On the other hand, *1h  is affected by the 
dispersal pattern, and a higher α  reduces *2π  and increases *1π . 
Finally, Table 3 illustrates the other cases of sequential harvesting, referred to as b) and c)  
together with a.ii), where the fall harvesting price is still fixed as 6,500p = . Together with the 
other parameter values, we then find that the smallest price difference that ensures * 0y = be-
comes 373v =  (NOK per moose), cf. equation [13`]. Accordingly, winter harvesting is not prof-
itable when ( ) 6,127q p v< − = , and the table demonstrates this case when 6,000q =  (see also 
Table 1). On the other hand, * 0y >  is optimal when 6,127q > , and simulations demonstrate that 
we have situation a.ii) with * 0y >  as well as *2 0h >  up to 6,183q = . Table 3 illustrates this 
case when 6,150q = . As demonstrated in Section 3 (above), case b) with *2 0h =  and * 0y > , 
takes place for an even higher value of q . Table 3 illustrates this case when 6,500q = . 
 
Table 3 about here 
              The calculations reported in Table 3 again indicate that introduction of winter harvesting 
may be a very powerful tool for redistribution of profit between areas and landowners while the 
total profit and the stock sizes are only modestly affected. In case a.ii) the selection gain more 
than outbalances the loss due to lower harvesting price, and for the given parameter values this is 
accompanied by a quite significant redistribution of profit between areas and landowners com-
pared to situation c) with no winter harvesting. This redistribution is further strengthened when q 
shifts up, and we have case b) with only winter harvesting in area 2. The redistribution is always 
governed by large shifts in harvesting rates. 
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper, we have analyzed a species that is both valuable and a pest and where there 
is an economic interdependency between different landowners utilizing the species due to disper-
sal. Management is studied within a unified framework, where the wildlife manager (the planner) 
aims to find area-specific harvesting quotas that maximize the net economic benefit of harvesting 
income and forestry damage to the areas taken together in biological equilibrium. The wildlife 
manager, therefore, sets quotas for the areas based on an overall economic and ecological as-
sessment. The cost and benefit streams are controlled by the wildlife manager and distributed to 
landowners. Such a property rights structure is more or less in line with present management 
practice in Norway and Scandinavia. 
In the first part of the paper—the Regime 1 situation where harvesting of the Alces alces 
only takes place in the fall—we show how dispersal influences stock sizes, harvesting quotas and 
browsing damage. It is also demonstrated that the present practice of neglecting migration leads 
either to too large or too small populations of migrating moose. By taking migration into account 
when setting harvesting quotas, a larger degree of accordance between harvesting income and 
browsing damage between the different landowners is attained. In addition, the total economic 
viability of the moose populations generally increases. 
In the second part of the paper, still under a unified management scheme, we analyze the 
Regime 2 situation where it is opened up for winter harvesting and sequential harvesting in the 
area where the browsing damage is most substantial. It is demonstrated that winter harvesting 
may improve total profitability even if the harvesting license price is lower in the winter than in 
the fall. Increased overall profitability with a lower hunting license price in the winter is a coun-
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terintuitive result. The explanation is that through winter harvesting it is possible to separate the 
harvest of the migratory and the stationary fraction of the migratory sub-population, and thus 
more efficiently hunt the fraction of the migratory sub-population that causes most severe graz-
ing damage. This selection gives a potential overall profitability gain, while the reduced hunting 
license price represents a potential loss. A substantial difference in harvesting prices reduces the 
efficiency of winter harvesting as a tool in wildlife management while a substantial difference in 
browsing damage works in the opposite direction.  
It is also shown that winter harvesting seems to be a very effective measure to redistribute 
harvesting income in accordance with browsing costs between areas and landowners. Winter 
harvesting is, however, only one possible way to redistribute profit. The above mentioned com-
pensation scheme in the Swe-Nor region allowing the Swe landowners to hunt in the Nor area is 
another possibility, and represents a type of side-payment. One obvious argument for the winter 
harvesting alternative is that such a scheme may increase overall profit. One argument against 
this alternative is that it introduces an additional uncertainty as the assumption of the same har-
vesting fraction of the migratory and stationary animals during the winter may be violated. 
Hence, when this happens and if the resulting stock level in the winter harvesting area becomes 
low,  the question of inbreeding and the threat of depletion may arise. In such situations, neglect-
ing stochastic elements, as we have done, is a critical assumption. The existing side payment 
compensation scheme may therefore be better suited to handle uncertainties with low population 
levels. 
Models are only approximations of how we conceive reality, and they are only as good as 
the assumptions on which they are based. Environmental and biological stochastic variations are 
neglected, and potentially instability problems are not studied.  The analysis  is carried out in 
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ecological equilibrium where current profit is maximized. Maximizing present-value profit is an 
obvious alternative management goal. Under the given cost and benefit assumptions, such a 
problem is linear in the harvesting rates controlling the dynamics, and hence it is of the ‘singular’ 
type (Clark 1990). The analysis of the long-term equilibrium (steady-state) of this problem, how-
ever, does not add much compared to the present analysis as the two equilibrium solutions coin-
cide when the rate of discount is equal to zero (see, e.g., Munro and Scott 1985). On the other 
hand, there is a fundamental difference between these two approaches as the present exposition 
of maximizing profit in ecological equilibrium implies that the moose stock as a capital asset is 
neglected. Hence, when the discount rate is equal to zero, the opportunity cost of capital is zero 
as well. Our analysis is also carried out in an aggregate manner because the moose population is 
considered as biomass. The reality is obviously more complex as there are selective harvesting 
schemes with different harvesting values between males, females and calves, and there are varia-
tions in grazing pressure and damage between the different sex and age groups. The migration 
pattern may clearly also be more complex than just seasonal migration. However, by making all 
these simplifications, it is possible to reveal some important driving forces that we will also find 
in a more complex, and hence realistic, setting. The present model framework may also be appli-
cable in other economic, ecological and institutional settings when studying fugitive species rep-
resenting positive and negative value enjoyed by different agents or groups of people. 
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APPENDIX 1 
REGIME 2 MANAGEMENT 
           As 1 1 1 1(1 )(1 )[ ( )]Z h X F X= − −α +  is the equilibrium area 1 winter stock, the area 1 equi-
librium profit writes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1[ ( )] (1 )(1 )[ ( )]ph X F X a h X F Xπ = + − − −α +  under the assumption of 
a linear damage function. When replacing 1h  by use of sub-population 1 equilibrium condition 
1
1
1 1
1
(1 )[ ( )]
Xh
y X F X
= − − α + ,  the expression for 1π  in the main text is obtained.  
            The size of the equilibrium winter stock in area 2 becomes 
2 2 2 2 1 1 1(1 ){(1 )[ ( )] (1 ) [ ( )]Z y h X G X h X F X= − − + + − α + . The winter harvest of sub-population 1 
is 1 1 1(1 ) [ ( )]y h X F X− α +  while the winter harvest of sub-population 2 is 2 2 2(1 )[ ( )]y h X G X− + . 
The area 2 profit function therefore reads 
[ ]2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1( ) {(1 )[ ( )] (1 ) [ ( )]}ph X G X qy h X G X h X F Xπ = + + − + + − α + −   
2 2 2 2 1 1 1(1 ){(1 )[ ( )] (1 ) [ ( )]}a y h X G X h X F X− − + + − α + . When again replacing 1h  by the sub-
population 1 equilibrium condition, we obtain 2π  as given in the main text. 
The first order conditions of the maximization problem 
1 2 2 2 2 2( ) {(1 )(1 )[ ( )] }L y h X G X X= π + π + λ − − + −  (cf. the main text) reads 
 
1 2
1
1
(1 ) (1 ) ( )0 '( )
(1 )
a a y p q yL F X
X p y
−α + − α + − α∂ = → =∂ − α ,           [A1]     
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2
2 2 2 2
0 '( ) 1
[ ( )(1 )](1 )
L G X
X ph qy a y h
∂ λ= → = −∂ + + λ − − − ,            [A2]      
 
2
2
0 [ ( )(1 )] 0L p qy a y
h
∂ ≤ → − + −λ − ≤∂ ; 2 0h ≥                                                                         [A3] 
 
and  
 
2 1 2 2
2 22
1
( )(1 ) ( ) ( )0 ( )(1 ) 0
(1 )
a a p q X G XL q a h
y y X
− −α − − +∂ ≤ → − λ − − − ≤∂ − α α ; 0y ≥ .                    [A4]   
 
In addition we have the biological equilibrium constraint for sub-population 2   
 
2 2 2 2(1 )(1 )[ ( )]y h X G X X− − + = .                          [A5] 
 
The above system yields five conditions between five variables 1 2 2, , ,X X h y and λ . The 
area 1 harvesting fraction follows then recursively through the sub-population 1 equilibrium 
condition 
 
1 1 1 1(1 )(1 )[ ( )]X h y X F X= − − α + .                [A6] 
 
When the ecological and economic conditions lead to possibility a) with *2 0h >  and 
* 0y > , [A3] as well as [A4] hold as equations. When manipulating [A3] slightly the shadow 
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price may be written as 
*
*
2 *
( )
(1 )
p q ya p
y
−λ = + + − . Substitution into [A2] gives  
* *
* 2
2 *
( ) (1 )( )
(1 )
p q y a yG X
p y
− + −′ = − , and solving for the stock size under logistic growth yields the 
main text equation [10] while the main text equation [9] follows directly from [A1]. Combina-
tion of [A3] and [A4] as equities and [A5] yield condition [11].  
Possibility b) with *2 0h =  and * 0y >  happens with [A3] as an inequality and [A4] as an 
equality. [A3] then states the shadow price as 
*
*
2 *
( )
(1 )
p q ya p
y
−λ > + + − .  Combination of condi-
tions [A3]-[A5] gives the main text inequality [12].  
Finally, we have possibility c) with *2 0h >  and * 0y = . [A3] then holds as equality while 
[A4] is an inequality. [A3] now therefore yields the shadow price as * 2a pλ = + . Hence, adding 
one more sub-population 2 moose to be hunted increases overall profitability with the amount of 
2a p+  due to reduced area 2 damage cost and increased hunting profit. Combination of condi-
tions [A3]-[A5] gives the main section inequality [13]. 
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APPENDIX 2 
CONVEX DAMAGE COST FUNCTIONS REGIME 1 MANAGEMENT 
 
Strictly convex grazing damage costs are introduced by specifying the cost functions as 
2
2
i
i i i i
bD a Z Z= +  with 0ia > and 0ib >  (i =1,2). The first order conditions [5] and [6] are then 
replaced by  
 
 
( )
*
* 1 2 2 2
1 2 2
1 2
1
(1 )1
12
a a b XX r
pb br
K p
⎡ ⎤−α + α + α= −⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤−α + α ⎣ ⎦+⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦                                                    [5`]      
 
 
 and  
 
*
* 2 2 1
2
2
2
1
2
a b XX r
pbr
K p
⎡ ⎤+ α= −⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦+⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
,                                [6`] 
 
respectively. In contrast to the linear cost case, these conditions are interdependent. Moreover, 
the migration coefficient affects both sub-populations. 
Table 4 demonstrates some numerical results where the parameters in the damage func-
tions are calibrated so that the average damage cost in both areas are close to the average 
(=marginal) cost in the linear case for the baseline migration coefficient 0.2α = . The average 
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damage cost is 1,500 (NOK per moose) in area 1 and 2,500 in area 2 when *1 614X =  and 
*
2 139X = .  
 
 Table 4 about here 
The table shows that when having convex damage functions we obtain lower stock sizes 
for the same average damage costs as in the linear case because the marginal damage costs now 
are higher. The profitability distribution among the two areas, however, follows much of the 
same pattern as in the linear case in section four.  
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 According to Norwegian wildlife law, the State through the Directorate for Wildlife and Nature Management (‘Di-
rektoratet for Naturforvaltning’) determines the number of animals to be hunted within each management area, 
where the size of the management area depends on institutional as well as ecological factors. In a next step, the total 
quota is distributed between the landowners within the management area. These owners form a hunting board and 
decide how to harvest and share the quota. In the present analysis, the two areas, with two different landowners, 
represent the management area. The management goal is usually to maximize the meat value in ecological equilib-
rium (Saether et al. 1992). While grazing damage is normally taken into account, this is often in an ad-hoc manner. 
Costs related to traffic damage are rarely considered. 
2 The dispersal is density independent because flow between the areas is not related to the relative species density 
between the areas. As mentioned, such a dispersal pattern is in contrast to Huffaker et al. (1992). See also Sanchirico 
and Wilen (2001) for a broader discussion. 
3 Normally, the seasonal migratory moose tend to migrate from summer ranges on hilly ground and down to valleys 
with less snow and where the concentration of moose improves the opportunity to derive advantage from walking in 
each other’s tracks in order to reduce the cost of locomotion (Ball et al. 2001).  
4The damage may take place immediately and damaged young pine trees may be replaced directly. Often, however, 
there is a time lag between browsing and the occurrence of damage. In such instances, discounting is not taken ex-
plicitly into account in the present exposition. 
5 Mattson (1994) observed a positive stock-dependent willingness to pay for hunting licenses in Sweden while an 
ambiguous effect was observed between the price and the number of animals hunted. See also Johansson et al. 
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(1988). The present assumption of a fixed harvesting price can be justified by the presence of competition between 
different suppliers of hunting licences.  
6 It can easily be shown that when the natural growth functions are strictly concave and the damage cost functions 
are convex (as here), the second order conditions are fulfilled. Furthermore, under these conditions, the solution is 
unique as well. 
7 In the present context, landowner 2 will typically argue that landowner 1 profits at his expense. However, this 
argument is somewhat obscure because harvesting of sub-population 1 always reduces grazing pressure and damage 
taking place in area 2. In line with this, it should also be noticed that a property rights scheme following the above 
unified management scheme makes landowner 2 better off compared to the private solution (‘the market solution’) 
where both landowners maximize current profit separately and reap the profit accordingly. The private solution 
yields first order conditions as [3] and [4], except that the term αD2’(.) is absent in equation [3]. In the linear version 
of the model, the term a2α is therefore missing on the right hand side of equation [5]. As a consequence, X1 will be 
higher and X2 generally lower compared to the unified management scheme. Hence, landowner (and area) 1 profit 
rises while landowner (and area) 2 profit falls compared to the unified management scheme when area-specific 
profit coincides with landowner profit. 
8 Among others, Laukkanen (2001) analyses a sequential fishery model. However, we are not aware of any analysis 
of this type for land-based resources. 
9A thinner market is expected due to unfavourable hunting conditions (snow and cold weather). In addition, the 
trophy value aspect is less as the male moose has lost his antlers. 
10 Obviously, 1α = produces the same result as 1 2a a=  since 1a is irrelevant when the whole sub-population 1 mi-
grates out of area 1 (see main text below). 
11 As pointed out by one of the referees, higher profit might also bee seen in light of  Le Chatlier`s principle as intro-
ducing winter harvesting means more flexibility as the previous Regime 1 (tacitly) imposed constraint of no winter 
harvesting is eliminated. 
12 The decreasing area 1 profit when α exceeds a certain level may seem counterintuitive. At this level, reduced 
browsing damage is outweighed by an even higher reduction in harvesting income.  
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13 For area 1 we obtain 
0 0
1 1 1( ) (1 ) 6,500 0.47 1,158(1 1,158 / 4,550) 1,500 (1 0.2) 1,158 1, 248pF X a X− −α = ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ − ⋅ = (1,000 NOK). 
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TABLE 1 
REGIME 1. STOCK SIZES (NUMBER OF MOOSE), HARVESTING RATES AND PROFIT (1,000 NOK) FOR 
DIFFERENT MIGRATION RATES 
 
 
Migration rate (α) 
 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 
Stock, area 1 
X1* 
 
1,158 
 
1,009 
 
860 
 
711 
 
562 
 
413 
Stock, area 2 
X2* 
 
231 
 
231 
 
231 
 
231 
 
231 
 
231 
Total stock 
X* 
 
1,389 
 
1,240 
 
1,091 
 
942 
 
793 
 
644 
Harvest rate  
area 1 h1* 
 
0.26 
 
0.27 
 
0.28 
 
0.28 
 
0.29 
 
0.30 
Harvest rate  
area 2 h2* 
 
0.30 
 
0.30 
 
0.30 
 
0.30 
 
0.30 
 
0.30 
Profit, area 1 
π1* 
 
900 
 
1,188 
 
1,357 
 
1,406 
 
1,337 
 
1,148 
Profit, area 2  
π2* 
 
64 
 
-440 
 
-797 
 
-1,003 
 
-1,060 
 
-969 
Total profit 
π* 
 
964 
 
748 
 
561 
 
404 
 
276 
 
179 
 
Parameter values: 
a1=1,500 NOK per moose  
a2=2,500 NOK per moose 
 p =6,500 NOK per moose 
 r =0.47 
 K1 = 4,550 number of moose 
 K2= 2,540 number of moose 
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TABLE 2 
REGIME 2, CASE  a.i). STOCK SIZES (NUMBER OF MOOSE), HARVESTING RATES AND PROFIT (1,000 
NOK) FOR VARIOUS AREA 2 WINTER HARVESTING RATES 
 
 
Winter harvest rate (y*) 
 
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 
Stock, area 1 
X1* 
 
786 
 
786 
 
786 
 
786 
 
786 
 
786 
Stock, area 2 
X2* 
 
439 
 
439 
 
439 
 
439 
 
439 
 
439 
Total stock 
X* 
 
1,224 
 
1,224 
 
1,224 
 
1,224 
 
1,224 
 
1,224 
Harvest rate  
area 1 h1* 
 
0.28 
 
0.27 
 
0.27 
 
0.26 
 
0.25 
 
0.24 
Harvest rate  
area 2 h2* 
 
0.28 
 
0.24 
 
0.20 
 
0.15 
 
0.10 
 
0.04 
Profit, area 1 
π1* 
 
729 
 
664 
 
599 
 
532 
 
464 
 
394 
Profit, area 2  
π2* 
 
-83 
 
-19 
 
47 
 
114 
 
182 
 
252 
Total profit 
π* 
 
646 
 
646 
 
646 
 
646 
 
646 
 
646 
 
Parameter values: 
a1= a2=a =2,000 NOK per moose 
p =q =6,500 NOK per moose 
α = 0.2 
r =0.47 
K1 = 4,550 number of moose 
K2= 2,540 number of moose 
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TABLE 3 
REGIME 2. STOCK SIZES (NUMBER OF MOOSE), HARVESTING RATES AND PROFIT (1,000 NOK) FOR 
VARIOUS AREA 2 HARVESTING SCHEMES  
 
Winter harvesting price (q) 
 
6000 6150 6500 
 
Case c: 
 h2*>0, y*=0   
Case a.ii:  
h2*>0, y*>0 
Case b: 
 h2*=0, y*>0 
Stock, area 1 
X1* 
 
1,009 
 
1,018 
 
1,047 
Stock, area 2 
X2* 
 
231 
 
209 
 
231 
Total stock 
X* 
 
1,240 
 
1,227 
 
1,278 
Harvest rate  
area 1 h1* 
 
0.27 
 
0.25 
 
0.22 
Harvest rate  
area 2 h2* 
 
0.30 
 
0.20 
 
0.00 
Profit, area 1 
π1* 
 
0.00 
 
0.13 
 
0.30 
Profit, area 2  
π2* 
 
1,188 
 
984 
 
692 
Total profit 
π* 
 
-440 
 
-235 
 
110 
Stock, area 1 
X1* 
 
748 
 
749 
 
802 
 
Parameter values: 
a1=1,500 NOK per moose 
a2=2,500 NOK per moose 
p=6,500 NOK per moose 
α =0.2 
r =0.47 
K1 = 4,550 number of moose 
K2= 2,540 number of moose 
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TABLE 4 
REGIME 1. STRICTLY CONVEX GRAZING COSTS. STOCK SIZES (NUMBER OF MOOSE), HARVESTING 
RATES AND PROFIT (1,000 NOK) FOR DIFFERENT MIGRATION RATES  
 
 
Migration rate (α) 
 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 
Stock, area 1 
X1* 
 
664 
 
688 
 
653 
 
542 
 
373 
 
197 
Stock, area 2 
X2* 
 
188 
 
134 
 
84 
 
59 
 
69 
 
110 
Total stock 
X* 
 
852 
 
822 
 
737 
 
601 
 
442 
 
307 
Harvest rate  
area 1 h1* 
 
0.29 
 
0.29 
 
0.29 
 
0.29 
 
0.30 
 
0.31 
Harvest rate  
area 2 h2* 
 
0.30 
 
0.31 
 
0.31 
 
0.32 
 
0.31 
 
0.31 
Profit, area 1 
π1* 
 
1,002 
 
1,178 
 
1,277 
 
1,220 
 
964 
 
576 
Profit, area 2  
π2* 
 
71 
 
-266 
 
-606 
 
-795 
 
-715 
 
-425 
Total profit 
π* 
 
1,073 
 
912 
 
671 
 
425 
 
249 
 
150 
 
Parameter values: 
a1=1,100 NOK per moose 
a2=2,300 NOK per moose 
b1=b2=1.6 NOK per moose2 
 p =6,500 per moose 
 r =0.47 
K1 =4,550 number of moose 
 K2 =2,540 number of moose 
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FIGURE 1 
REGIME 1 POPULATION DYNAMICS 
 
 
 
 
 
Area 1: Partly migratory sub-population 
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